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By Air Marshal (Retd) B K Pandey
News A lot is being said about the intelligence failure of central agencies and the Navy that led to the attack on Mumbai but a review made by the Centre recently on the status of patrolling of its maritime zones across eight coastal states revealed a sordid saga of neglect and apathy. A report submitted by the Comptroller and Auditor General to the government in October said that a central scheme to procure 26 patrol boats at a cost of Rs 25 crore for patrolling of exclusive fishing zones in the first 12 miles of the coastline of eight states was largely unfruitful. The boats were "either not constructed or were lying idle and not being used for the intended purpose" while authorities even failed to carry out mid-course correction, it pointed out.
The terrorist attack of November 26 on the financial capital of the nation has rather traumatically driven home the reality that threat to national security from the seas is no longer hypothetical or distant.
With a coastline of over 7500 km, the issue of maritime security of India is infinitely complex and challenging.
Under the present scheme of things, the concept is to provide the nation with a three-layered security arrangement. The agency responsible for the surveillance of the first 10 NM from the coast line is the state government managed Marine Police (MP) or the Coastal Police. Despite substantial financial support from the centre for the establishment of MP, majority of the coastal states have failed to take this responsibility seriously. Hence the lack of mechanisms today for effective policing of the coastline. With the variety of marine craft and numbers operating in the coastal zone, the density of marine traffic is very high. In the recent past, lack of proper surveillance and tight control has often rendered the coastline vulnerable to intrusion by hostile elements. Even if an elaborate marine police is established in the near future, the land-bound state police forces will take a long time to acquire the skills and orientation necessary for policing the waves.
The Coast Guard (CG) which is responsible for surveillance of the next tier i. e. between 10 and 30 NM from the coastline, has only 75 vessels and 44 aircraft. It is understood that their assets are poorly maintained and actual availability of patrol craft and aircraft is low. Given the huge area to be secured and the limited resources available to them, the ICG can hardly measure up to the task.
The Indian Navy's (IN) argument pertaining to the criticality of the link between the well-being of the Indian economy and international commercial traffic across the oceans, is incontrovertible and needs no reiteration. In the action off the Somali coast, the IN has clearly demonstrated its determination, capability and commitment to fulfill the onerous responsibility of safeguarding sea lanes. The IN is also making vigorous efforts to build a credible operational capability to meet with the aspirations of and ride the crest of an emerging regional power with strategic and national security interests extending from the Gulf of Aden to the Straits of Malacca. Hopefully, the IN will soon have a new aircraft carrier and a new submarine fleet to replace the existing ageing assets. Preoccupied with the pursuit of lofty objectives, the IN may be less inclined to focus on coastal security.
Apart from the glaring disconnect amongst the Indian intelligence agencies, the compartmentalized nature of functioning, turf wars and the disconcerting lack of coordination amongst the IN, ICG and the MP constitute a recipe for disaster, as amply demonstrated in the 26/11 episode. But the most serious deficiency in the system is inadequacy of aerial surveillance capability both with the IN and the ICG. While high speed surface vessels would be necessary with all three organisations to intercept and inspect suspects, the quality and capability of remote sensing can be effectively enhanced through the medium of air using platforms such as long range maritime surveillance aircraft, long endurance UAVs and satellites both at strategic and tactical levels.
The ICG has plans to acquire the Swedish Space Corporation Maritime Surveillance System to be fitted on the medium range Dornier aircraft. This system includes a Side Looking Airborne Radar, Infrared/ Ultraviolet scanner, still camera and video cameras. However, present day sensors are hardly adequate as according to the Navy Chief, "there are 150000 registered fishing trawlers in India". Trying to identify hostile elements onboard a small size vessel in the coastal regions would be like "searching for a needle in a haystack". The requirement therefore would be to develop new sensor technologies with the capability of day/night, all-weather surveillance or remote sensing. Such facilities combined with next generation agile communication intelligence equipment and transponders mandated by law on board all marine craft, would facilitate accurate tracking and positive identification by airborne platforms. While this may appear impractical or unachievable at this point in time, but if the attack on Mumbai is a manifestation of the changing nature of warfare, the need for significant qualitative change in aerial remote sensing capability is urgent and inescapable to meet with the emerging challenges for maritime security.
By Air Marshal (Retd) V K Verma
Mumbai 26/11 stunned the nation. The 60 hour siege telecast live had every Indian glued to his television set. As the siege ended the television reporter then moved onto the list of failures and waived his mike at many experts who produced ‘instant analysis’ and ‘instant fix’. Poor Arthur Conan Doyle was turning in his grave at every ‘instant’ sound byte. Why shoot the messenger? Television reporters were only doing what they are best at – scratch the surface and produce ‘instant dirt’. If there is ‘instant dirt’ surely there will be ‘instant cleaners’ too! Unfortunately, life is too complex to give into such ‘instant nirvana’ solutions. Life is built on systems that are far too complex. Evolution is the order of the day. Not revolutions. Only a proper study of what went wrong and how to right it and then determined steps to right it will produce corrections.
One failure constantly flagged by the media in the initial stages was “this policeman has never fired a round in his life. What sort of police force do we have?” asked the reporter. Having retired from the Air Force recently after forty years of service – I could empathise with the policeman who probably never got the opportunity to fire, with his bosses who possibly could not provide him the opportunity to do so and with the reporter who was aghast at the blasphemy and “the system”. The second failure which has haunted us in the past many times resurfaced yet again with great ferocity - ‘Intelligence failure’ and what some termed as ‘lack of actionable intelligence’. Here too the experts blamed the system while the reporter and presumably the television audience continued to demonstrate surprise at what they considered as total incompetence.
My mind did a flashback as it reviewed own personal journey on these two issues and thereby hangs a tale. So please fasten your seat belts while I fly you through my personal history on these issues.
End of 1990 saw me take charge as the Chief Operations Officer (COO) at Air Force Station Tezpur. Newspapers regularly reported heightened ULFA activity and ULFA threat was acknowledged. For us at the Air Force Station it translated into an order that any service vehicle leaving the Guard Room must carry an armed escort for security. Armed escort meant an airman with a sten. A duty roster was made and an armed escort was available at the Guard Room. I was to visit the Tactical Air Centre which was some distance away. The armed escort boarded the Gypsy at the Guard Room. His handling of weapon while boarding the Gypsy aroused the suspicion that the weapon and the escort were probably strangers on a chance meeting. Throughout the journey I kept getting a spooky unsafe feeling not unlike the one that erupts when one sees a child with a weapon. Unable to restrain myself I confirmed from him if the weapon was loaded. Only when he confirmed that the rounds were in his pocket was I able to relax. As the order for armed escort remained in vogue for quite some time, I realised that no matter who the armed escort was, each had the ability to scare me with his display of sheer lack of ability to handle a weapon safely and correctly.
End of 2001 saw me as the Air Officer Commanding, Air Force Station Hakimpet. Mobilisation for forces and operational readiness status at the borders post terrorist attack on Parliament resulted in forty percent of my manpower augmented out to operational commands. The training task however, remained unchanged. The operational readiness scenario always ensures a good adrenaline flow and a general upbeat mood amongst soldiers. So, the extra work with lesser manpower posed no problem and everyone settled to a new very busy routine.
This busy routine was rudely interrupted when a signal arrived. It read “Lashkar-e-Toiba has shifted base from Kashmir to Hyderabad. Int reports confirm that Air Force Academy and College of Air Warfare already surveyed by terrorists. Take extra precautions and safeguard assets”.
I did a mental evaluation of my base. I had a large area to defend, very large number of assets to safeguard, an unchanged task with only half the manpower and a 24/7 threat looming menacingly overhead. To compound my fears, the “armed escort’ in the Gypsy at Tezpur scene kept flashing in front of my eyes as if to tell me that the personnel at my station could not be any different. In short, I had a big problem facing me. What did I do to solve it?
I collected the whole station and explained the new reality to everyone. First thing to be done was to make each man weapon-friendly. There was no armament range at the base. The Army units in the neighbourhood were deployed out and their range was made available to us. The whole station spent the next three days (Fri-Sun) at the range. While waiting for their turn to fire, they were all taught and made to practise the usage of walkie-talkies, pyro cartridges, emergency phones, usage of lathis, self defence, usage of search lights, operating in pairs, patrolling etc. The personnel were all charged up and ready to learn. Illumination in the technical area was increased with the addition of lights. Search lights were placed at vantage points around the boundary of technical area. Entries were strengthened with road blocks, shielded guards, better lighting and MMG posts. Men were put on duty in pairs and were tasked to patrol specific areas. Each armed man carried a loaded weapon ready to fire. Whistles and big torches became standard fits. The station had a valuable asset in the form of young flight cadets fresh from NDA and a pool of newly commissioned fighter pilots. They had to be used selectively and judiciously as each had to fly daily. So they were assigned QRT duties in turn for small time portions. Their enthusiasm and motivation was electric and it got transmitted to all the personnel. A regular check at all odd hours of the night impressed me with the sincerity and effectiveness of the personnel deployed as guards. I became confident that no terrorist could succeed in Hakimpet. Eyeball to eyeball confrontation between the forces at the border continued for a few more months.
This period allowed me to do some soul searching on this aspect. Why is it that our Air Force personnel are low on soldierly qualities? Isn’t that a basic aspect that an Armed Forces person must possess? Each organisation prepares its personnel according to the type of warfare it is to fight. For Air Force war has always meant operating from airfields that are far from borders. For the majority of the Air Force personnel warfighting implies preparing their aircraft for the mission. What is expected of them is high technical skills. Our airmen excel in it. The only action that they see is when enemy aircraft attack our bases. And in such cases response expected from them is purely defensive. This has been true from the time our Air Force was formed. Contact with the enemy is generally limited to pilots. The physicality of warfare as evidenced in Army is generally absent from Air Forces. This style of warfare rightly and naturally demands that our training pattern lay a very large emphasis on technical skills. The balance of effort is directed towards creation of soldierly skills. Even our airfields were earmarked for defence by Army units. For units like radar and missile squadrons who are deployed outside the airfields, the DSC platoons sufficed as the enemy was still miles away and the buffer of our own deployed troops provided them the sense of security. The local population surrounding our deployed troops were always friendly and supportive of our effort. So even the minimal soldierly qualities ingrained during basic training remained dormant and kept rusting due disuse.
The Punjab problem of the eighties changed the perception slightly. This led to an effort to improve our soldiering skills but mainly at bases in Punjab. Airfield security got a relook and Quick Reaction Team (QRT) was introduced. With the return of normalcy, the old ways regained their prominence and the soldier in our air warrior once again went under surface.
But the nature of warfare had changed drastically. Enemy had now infiltrated into the hinterland and was sitting right outside the fence/wall of the airfield. We in the Air Force did not respond appropriately to this new equation, this new element in the dynamics of war fighting. Our training patterns remained unchanged with focus on technical skills. We failed to develop in our personnel an ability to defend our ground and our assets – abilities normally associated with an Army Jawan. This was the new need of the hour. The circumstances demanded that each air warrior equal a Jawan in soldiering skill. I began in my own small way in real earnest – to encourage and help build soldierliness in our air warriors at Air Force Station Hakimpet. The situation on the border was sufficient motivation for our personnel to perform above par. We at Hakimpet became very proud of our security methodology and in our ability to deny terrorists any advantage.
A few months later reason triumphed and the eyeball to eyeball confrontation across the border came to an end. Augmentees were returned to sender. I was also an augmentee for a month at an operational Command HQs. I too returned with a firmer resolve to make sure that officers and airmen who were out of Hakimpet on augmentation would also be trained to the same level of soldierliness as the others who had remained at base. The plan was to give a break/spell of leave to the augmentees and then reset their training clock. However, God had different plans. Instead of me setting the training agenda at Hakimpet, I found myself posted out on promotion as Commandant of Air Force Academy. I packed my bags and moved a few kilometres away to meet the newer challenges.
My first step was to collect all the officers and personnel as if in a welfare meeting. I asked them their opinion on what are the valuable assets at the Academy that could be targetted by the terrorists. Not surprisingly, the first item mentioned was weapons in the armoury. The Academy personnel were convinced that it is the naxals who will target them. Lashkar-e-Toiba recce of AFA had obviously not been told to them and hence it did not surprise me that aircraft as a vulnerability came up only after some prompting. I shared with them the int report. They slowly suggested all the possible targets. I used the blackboard and chalk method and together we prioritised those items. I prodded them to offer solutions. My aim was to make each man at base realise that he is an extremely important element in the security calculus and that he has as much at stake. One can’t distance oneself from security and leave it all at the doorstep of security officer/Chief Adm Officer/Station Commander. The nature of warfare has changed. Each man is now needed to perform his part correctly – only then can we all be safe and feel safe. The marathon session was very productive. One Warrant Officer insisted on the importance of our armoury and the need for QRT to be there. He obviously was defending status quo and kept saying that Naxals would otherwise snatch the weapons away. I countered him with a question. Who is stronger - an unarmed naxal or an armed guard? It was clear to me that the personnel did not view the weapon as a source of strength. Instead they saw it as a vulnerability. A few examples, some discussion and the mindset begin to give way. They all confessed that their inability to handle weapon well, their non-exposure to matters military and field craft was the basic source of their wrong notions and incorrect assumptions. In fact they suggested that in view of the changed nature of warfare which they now recognised they should be trained to become more military or more soldierly. That session produced a fantastic result. It won me the co-operation of my personnel in my drive to strengthen the security at base.
Destiny always favours the man with the mission. I was blessed with a Deputy Commandant and a Chief Operations Officer who in their previous lives must have been in the Army because they were so very strongly attached to words like discipline, rangework, fieldcraft, obstacles, tents, routemarch, overalls, camp, etc. Within a week an exercise named “Shiksha” was produced. The men would assemble at the armoury, draw rifles, routemarch to the camp site near range, carry out drill, fire at the range, go through an obstacle course, pitch a tent and relearn fire fighting. Full strength of the Academy would go through this exercise each quarter. No Shiksha – no leave was the prevalent mantra.
The Chief Instructor baulked – how do I finish my training task if I let you get away with Ex Shiksha! It will eat away precious working days. Chief Engineering Officer asked, how do I do my maint work? Combination of innovation and the Indian Rope Trick was applied and a magical formula erupted. One week per quarter Ex Shiksha would be held Monday to Friday. Morning session would be from 7 – 12 and the afternoon session from 1 – 6 pm. Two sessions per day for five days produced ten sessions. Each section had to detail 10% of its manpower in each session. Thus over 10 sessions full manpower would undergo Shiksha. And those that failed to send their people in these five days would send them on the weekend on Sunday. Sections could not complaint as only a 10% loss of manpower was demanded from them. No ‘offs’ were permitted for participants as the Exercise was treated as a ‘surge activity’ for wartime scenario. This ensured that most objections to this new activity were at best muted. Did everyone take kindly to this new focus on soldierly qualities? Wasn’t there a backlash from people who only wanted to confine themselves to their spheres of expertise – technical or non-technical? Didn’t they see it as an unwarranted intrusion? Well, yes and no. My marathon session with the personnel had succeeded in getting the basic acceptance from most. The increase in their own skill levels at handling weapons and improved outdoor skills added to their own self esteem. Of course, there were nay-sayers too. An SNCO at Pune Air Force Base was overheard speaking thus to his friend “Are yaar, buch gaye. Shukar hai hamara posting Air Force Academy se ho gaya. Ek naya Commandant aaya hai. Bilkul pagal hai. Hum sub ko Army jawan banana chahta hai.” This was reported verbatim to me by my brother ( also in Air Force) who happened to overhear it. He too was curious to know about the “bimari” I was spreading. Banter apart, I was really lucky to get full support, co-operation and whole hearted participation from my personnel at the Academy. Their participation was sincere and they all believed in this new training programme towards better security.
The security net was reknitted. I brought in the Hakimpet methodology into Academy. Sergeants patrolled the domestic area armed with whistles, torches and lathis. Cpl and below performed regular guard duties. A healthy mix of static guards and patrolling guards ensured the safety of technical and domestic area. A few “shikshas” later the skill levels rose very high. We then began to increase/change the contents so that curiosity and learning value keep the exercise vibrant and interesting. Unarmed combat and basic self defence was included. A scooter accident in the camp highlighted that most of us have forgotten whatever was taught about First Aid in school. So, first aid was added with the Doctor demonstrating and making all rehearse the basics of first aid. Academy acquired a small arms simulator (Drona). It was promptly amalgamated into Shiksha. Its effect was seen in the improved range results. When day field craft started losing its challenge and became routine work for all, Ex Shiksha was shifted to dusk and night time – moon phase followed by dark phase. GPS usage and its knowledge was made mandatory. Each man became a walkie talkie expert. Fire fighting practices were added to the training syllabus. The pitching of new tents is a nightmare for the beginner. It soon became routine work for the air warrior at Academy. Ex Shiksha slowly became popular mainly because my Security Officer kept tweaking the format regularly so that it continuously produced new challenges.
On the eve of my departure from Air Force Academy on posting, a special competitive exercise named “Poorna Sidhi” was conducted. The setting of the exercise resembled Kargil operations by night. The entire station personnel participated. They were divided into flights of 30 airmen with 6 officers each. Exercise commenced at 1800 hours. Setting given was that one of our pilots had ejected in enemy territory close to the border. His GPS co-ords were given to each team. The team had to reach there, give first aid to the pilot, rescue him, collect some important part of the wreckage and bring the pilot back to the camp on a stretcher. DSC guards were positioned enroute to ambush the team on both outbound and inbound routes. Each member of the team with most success in least time was given an Academy crested wrist watch as a prize. This was followed up by an inter flight tent pitching competition. The josh, the professionalism, the team spirit and comraderie on display that night can only be equalled on warfront. My shirt buttons could not contain my chest – so swollen with pride it was. Balance of the evening was planned as my farewell rum punch and bara khana at the camp site itself. It was clear to me that I had succeeded in digging up the soldierly traits lying dormant in the Air Warriors. One airman confessed to me that night that prior to his participation in Ex Shiksha when he went on leave to his village, his guilt always shamed him because his village mates looked up to him respectfully and called him “Fauji”. Inherent in the respect shown was an assurance that he would handle weapons well and keep harm away from the village. He loathed his discomfort with weapons. But after a few “Shikshas” he now holds his shoulders high, his chest out and enjoys the respect of his village-mates as he now feels like a proper professional “Fauji”. He has grown immensely in his own self esteem. One airman while driving me out of the camp showed me a row of scooters and asked me if I had noticed that the third wheel was back in its designed space as no one pilfered it anymore. In fact all thefts had stopped. There was a total sense of security in the camp. I knew I was the winner in this battle with the terrorists.
Did I stop at ex Shiksha? No. The Academy also trained 400 cadets who were being toughened up physically and taught soldierliness. However security was being treated as a specialist subject for the Admin Branch only. I felt each cadet regardless of his branch must feel that security is his business and is not to be left for the security officer. So, a few additional lectures on “Security at an Airfield” were added to every branch’s syllabus. A sand model competition was introduced wherein teams containing a mix of all branches would provide solutions for security - the aim behind all this was to make everyone part of the security solution as security is actually everyone’s problem.
The test of relevance and usefulness of any initiative lies in its survival beyond the change of guard at the top. The naysayers could get the initiative killed by distorting it to the next Boss. Ex Shiksha not only survived my replacement but even his replacement. This convinced me that I was not alone in realising that the nature of warfare has changed and that we the Air Warriors must upgrade our soldierly skill levels. I realised that I must now institutionalise “Shiksha” throughout the Air Force specially when the Air Force has appointed me as the Director General (Inspection & Safety) – the official “Operations Watchdog”. So, in 2007, the scheme was rechristened ‘Akash Yodha’and put up to Chief of Air Staff for approval. He asked each command to try it at 2 – 3 bases and give a feedback. On receiving a most positive feedback from all commands orders were issued by Chief of Air Staff to conduct it at each base on a quarterly basis. The institutionalising of Ex Akash Yodha was now complete.
The tale of the journey of the air warrior to upgrade himself to an Akash Yodha ends. As you now realise, some of us in the Air Force had also lost our expertise with weapons due to our focus on our primary skills needed for aircraft maintenance. Can you imagine the surprise on the television reporter’s face? Does not matter. What matters is that we in the Air Force realised this and applied the necessary corrections. As I have recounted, this is not so easy. Let me also reassure you that I was not alone in this journey. The system was corrected quickly because others too realised the shortfalls. There are any number of establishments in the country in a similar situation where guarding of assets is left to the ingenuity of the local boss. Resources may or may not match the needs. I hope recounting of this personal journey in how I went about the task may be of some help and guidance to others. Before I land and you unfasten your seat belts, let me reiterate a few issues for the leader. Security is too important to be left only for the security officer. In this day and age security has to become everyone’s concern. The leader must study the nature of threats to his assets and human resources. He must continuously evaluate and spot the changes. The threat invariably has a global face as well as a local face. The system by itself is too slow to comprehend and respond to the new challenges that are thrown up. Don’t restrict your vision by what is laid down and what is expected of you by the book. You as the leader must identify the changes that need to be incorporated, make an action plan, sell it to your personnel and then implement the plan. A good leader’s actions will always lead to the revision of the rule book. Your conviction and clear headed logic will ensure that your men follow you in every situation. The recount of this journey is primarily aimed at the younger Obama generation which is much smarter than ours.
Please do prove it – you hold the reins now.
By Air Marshal (Retd) N Menon
Homeland Unsecured The 26/11 attack on Mumbai was planned and executed as a military operation. Over 200 perished including innocent civilians, both Indian and foreign, and security personnel. Apart from the serious damage to high profile assets such as the Taj and Oberoi hotels, India’s image as a secure destination lay badly bruised.
To some extent it reduced our belief in India as a nation state. It revealed a systemic paralysis in responding to crisis situations resulting from years of political neglect of national security imperatives. A few well trained and organized terrorists navigated a large swathe of Indian Ocean, unloaded huge quantities of deadly weapons and explosives on our sovereign soil and inflicted carnage and destruction for over 60 hours in a city considered the nation's economic and financial powerhouse. In the aftermath of this attack, viewed 'live' by millions in India and abroad, answers are being sought as to what went wrong and who all are to be held accountable.
While political costs are calculated, options for possible actions against perpetrators and their mentors generated and corrective measures finalised, it would be in order to examine existing structures in place to afford security to our homeland. This examination would also include broad aspects of operations to thwart such attacks and plans for the future that are currently on the anvil. The analysis would be restricted to attacks emanating from the sea and air.
India has a coast-line of more than 7500 km that passes along nine states and four Union Territories and touches 13 major and nearly 200 minor ports. And in their hinterland are the people and cities. There are major strategic targets like nuclear installations, petroleum refineries, crucial communication lines and many other vulnerable points along or very close to our coast-line. Off-shore, there are oil platforms like the Bombay High and those coming up off the eastern coast that constitute lucrative targets. There are hundreds of merchant ships carrying vital cargo near our shores that are susceptible to coercive action, given the current example set by pirates off the Somali coast, who have been, despite patrolling of the area by warships of many nations, regularly capturing merchant ships in and around the Gulf of Aden for ransom. To protect our coastal and offshore assets we have a three tiered or layered security system. For the coast and 10 km into the sea, responsibility is vested in the Marine Police Force(MPF). From 10 to 50 km is the Coast Guard's(CG) jurisdiction and beyond that the Indian Navy(IN) is to provide protection. But there are other agencies like customs, revenue intelligence directorate, environmental protection bureaus and even the fisheries department of some states who control one aspect or another of coastal security. In all, there are 14 agencies charged with different aspects of. coastal security. These agencies report to different ministries at the centre and the state. The ensuing confusion and lack of co-ordination severely hampers timely decisions with criminals and others exploiting the hiatus.
Against the backdrop of 1993 terror attacks in Mumbai, a concept of marine police force was mooted in 2006 and the go-ahead was given in 2007. It took 14 years for the Indian system to react. Sanction was accorded to set up 73 coastal police stations, 97 check posts and 58 outposts. The MPF are to be equipped with 204 boats, 150 jeeps and 300 plus motorcycles. Orders for 90 high speed boats of the 10 tonne and 20 tonne class have been placed with indigenous ship builders. A delivery schedule beginning 2010 has been indicated and the 26/11 events might see a hastening of deliveries. The MPF is a state controlled force and has not become effective in most states. At places the MPF is forced to borrow boats from local fishermen to carry out their patrol duties. Insufficiently trained for marine related tasks, these forces generally consist of police personnel who cannot be accommodated elsewhere. The MPF in its current form is, in most states, an ill-trained, ill-equipped and undermanned force unable to carry out its tasks with any level of effectiveness. The 26/11 attack might just be the wake-up call to states and UT authorities to revamp this force.
The Indian Coast Guard (ICG) came into being as an interim organisation under the Naval HQ on February 01, 1977. Initially culled from the IN the Coast Guard's mandate was to “ protect our ocean & offshore wealth including oil, fish and minerals, to assist mariners in distress and safeguard life and property at sea, to enforce maritime laws with respect to sea, shipping, poaching, smuggling and narcotics, to preserve marine environment and ecology and protect rare species, to collect scientific data and backup the Indian Navy during war.” At that time two frigates were seconded to the ICG from the IN and five patrol boats belonging to the Home Ministry were transferred to the fledgling force. The CG has expanded over the years. It has 92 ships that include among others, 13 inshore patrol vehicles, two seaward defence boats, 24 interceptor crafts, 11 fast patrol vehicles, nine offshore patrol vehicles and five advanced OPVs. The ICG has six hovercrafts and 45 aircraft comprising 24 fixed wing and 21 rotary wing. Obsolescence and ageing are major problems. The ICG has projected a requirement of 268 ships, 113 aircraft and 18 unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs). Future requirement also includes a wide array of radars for sea surveillance which is currently a weak area.
The Indian Navy is a powerful regional force with proven capabilities in war and peace. In the Indian system of budgeting, the IN has always been short-changed, with our planners unable to grasp the increasing importance of the maritime dimension of national security. The Indian Navy today requires infusion of a large number of warships, both as replacement for its retiring crafts as well as for growth to meet the exponentially expanding challenges. The 26/11 attacks have only highlighted the type of threats that can emanate from the seas.
However, despite the layered defences, the terror perpetrators were able to avoid detection and sail in Indian territorial waters and come ashore to attack Mumbai. As is becoming clear from the charges and counters being alleged post the event, the cause could be attributed to the old Indian malaise of lack of co-ordination, a deficit in trust among the players concerned and the absence of a central authority to take charge during such crises. It has been alleged that the intelligence agencies did not provide 'actionable inputs', the ICG and IN did not adequately 'pay heed' to warnings and the state government was utterly unprepared for any kind of emergency.
The National Security Guard (NSG) arrived ten hours after being requisitioned. The delay is attributable to casual and lackadaisical attitude of many along the chain. On arrival, the NSG was without proper maps or briefing. The NSG, of which more is seen and heard in their role as protectors of the mighty and powerful, is a force raised in 1986 and their tasks are to neutralise terrorist threats, handle aircraft hijack situations, bomb disposal, post blast investigation and rescue of hostages. NSG has around 15000 personnel and the 'Special Action Group' which is the offensive arm is constituted mainly by Indian Army combatants on deputation. In the Mumbai 26/11 case, which it tackled and brought to an end but with understandable delay, given the hostage situation, the NSG encountered a classic urban guerrilla warfare situation and there would be many lessons carried back to the training centre at Manesar and HQ at Delhi. The local police blundered along and yet managed to capture one of the terrorists alive. The actions of the other agencies involved including the media have attracted fulsome praise and harsh criticism in equal measure.
An event that could have led to an equally dangerous situation as the Mumbai 26/11 took place in December 1995, when a Latvian aircraft dropped a large quantity of arms near the town of Purulia in West Bengal. The aircraft entered Indian airspace with proper identification but its movements within India were not tracked due to the scant radar cover in the area. This weakness was obviously known to the crew who exploited the gaps in radar cover to descend to lower altitudes and drop their deadly consignment in the target area. It was fortunate that the arms were discovered and the aircraft, on its return trip, was intercepted by IAF MiG-21 fighters and forced to land at Mumbai. The crew was taken into custody, tried, convicted and imprisoned. The weapons consignment was believed to be consigned to an organisation whose radical ideas were not acceptable to the state. But the identity of the consignee was never fully established. The arms could very well have been for a terrorist group intent on creating havoc and the incident highlighted vulnerabilities in the Indian air space.
India is divided into five Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ). Aircraft entering any of these zones have to obtain prior clearance, fly on designated airways and remain in radio contact with air traffic control organisation. Enforcement of such regulations requires the entire area to be under positive radar cover. This has not been the case on the Indian mainland because of shortage of radars, both civil and military. While the airspace along the western land border is reasonably well covered, the coastal areas in the west are deficient in radar cover rendering them susceptible to violations from the air. A similar state obtains in other parts of our country, including coastal areas in the east and south. Radars which are capable of detection and identification have to be backed up by armed interceptor aircraft that can enforce the will of the nation on erring or straying aeroplanes. It is only in the northern sectors that this capability is available during peacetime.
In North America, USA and Canada are surrounded by an ADIZ which runs almost exclusively over water, and is administered jointly by the civil air traffic control authorities and the militaries of both the nations, under the overall control of the North American Aerospace Defence Command or NORAD. Any aircraft flying into or in these zones without proper authorisation may be identified as a threat and treated as an enemy aircraft liable to be intercepted by fighters. USA and Canada have sufficient and overlapping radar cover with fighters backing up, and this entire mechanism has been strengthened after 9/11. Perhaps India has to conceptualise an air defence system on similar lines appropriately modified to suit local conditions.
The contours of the recently announced Coastal Command, in itself a welcome development, are not yet known but the planners would do well to avoid the pitfalls of the past. The proposed command should not become another bureaucratic hurdle in the already existing muddle. Some aspects that need consideration are:
• the command must have legal and constitutional sanction.
• the relationship of the command and intelligence agencies like R&AW, IB and others must be enunciated without ambiguity.
• jurisdictional boundaries to be delineated.
• the procedural aspects of interface between forces that fall under MOD and MOH be specified.
• command and control during normal and emergency situations be laid down.
• Accountability be established up the chain including the bureaucracy.
• a realistic time frame be stipulated for operationalisation of the command.
As the Coastal Command will have military oriented tasks, its placement under the Chairman COSC (or the CDS when appointed) is one option, but the apprehension is that many organisations would be more inclined towards calculating the additional vacancies coming their way with the establishment of this new command rather than thinking of making it a success.
While the proposal to establish NSG hubs at the four metros is laudable, any further stretching would tend to dull the cutting edge of this commando force. It should also be realised that no system can sustain a very high state of alert without degradation of human and equipment efficiency. The future attackers also will have, like the 26/11 terrorists, the advantage of surprise. But reaction should be focussed and state and city agencies need provide swift response and take up battle stations as early as possible to minimise loss of life and property. Training and education of citizens should be undertaken to sensitise them to such contingencies.
Terrorists are without conscience and if not the same group that struck at Mumbai, another one will attempt a copy-cat attack. If then the Indian state can respond effectively and aggressively to control the situation and eliminate the terrorists, then the lives lost in Mumbai on 26/11 would not have gone in vain.
By Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash
The Maritime Perils of Our Times
For nearly six decades after independence, we remained oblivious to the fact that a peninsular country like India, circumscribed by high mountain ranges to its north, is as abjectly dependent on the ocean environment for its trade, security and economic well being, as any island nation. It was the opening up of our economy in the early years of the last decade, and the consequent globalization of trade that triggered a change in perceptions. The realization has slowly begun to dawn on our politicians, bureaucrats and diplomats that the roots of economic prosperity lie in the safety of our maritime trade and energy lifelines, which can only be ensured if maritime security receives due importance.
But has there been a similar awakening in our national security establishment? India’s two sea services: the Indian Navy (IN) and the Coast Guard (CG) have been in the news in recent weeks because of events that have happened virtually at our doorstep in Mumbai, as well as in the distant waters of the Gulf of Aden. The passage of a few weeks since their occurrence has perhaps permitted us the necessary detachment to reflect on them.
Surprise and Intelligence
“Surprise” is one of the Principles of War, first enunciated by the 19th century German strategist Carl von Clausewitz. From the Trojan Horse episode to the Pearl Harbour attack, history has demonstrated that it is a key factor in the success of any well-planned and professionally executed operation. Equally, experience has demonstrated that the obvious antidote to surprise is sound and timely “intelligence”.
In this context, if we reflect briefly on the conflicts that the sub-continent has seen over the past six decades, we will see that starting with the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir a few weeks after Independence, and the 1962 Chinese attacks in NEFA and Ladakh, right up to the infiltration into Kargil heights in 1999, our intelligence apparatus has invariably let us down.
The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai were simply more of the same, and showed that people like us who fail to learn from history are condemned to re-live it: over and over again. Here, let me attempt to enlighten the ill-informed debate that followed this appalling episode, as a part of the post-facto “blame game” that different agencies seem to consider essential.
An intelligence report can be considered “actionable” only if it clearly contains three elements: WHAT (description), WHERE (position) and WHEN (date and time of detection). In the case of a mobile target (like a ship or aircraft) it needs a fourth ingredient: WHITHER (course and speed). If any of these ingredients is missing or vague, the user would be justified in classifying such intelligence as “unactionable” because pursuing it would not only result in a tremendous waste of effort, but even hazard lives of personnel.
India’s Strategic Naiveté
The ISI obviously plans 10-15 years ahead, and what we have been facing for some years now (and will continue to face), is best termed as “Asymmetric War”; waged by a ruthless and imaginative adversary with no holds barred. This war has many other dimensions, of which we notice only a few. Aiding separatism and insurgency, encouraging demographic invasion, attacking our economy by pumping in fake currency, inciting communal violence, and undermining the morale and cohesion of the armed forces (often through the instrumentality of the Indian media) are some other facets of this multi-pronged assault on the Indian state.
The most obvious manifestation of this asymmetric war has been the cold-blooded orchestration of violence in our urban areas amidst the civilian population. By refusing to recognize this as a war being waged against us, and treating it as a law and order issue, we have aided and abetted forces inimical to the Indian State.
One is not aware of how far ahead our own intelligence agencies look and plan, or whether they have any retaliatory measures up their sleeve. But it is obvious that we have kept the different aspects of these conflicts strictly compartmentalized, and hence our response to the Asymmetric War is disjointed, fragmented and disorganized.
Lessons From Kargil
Within two weeks of the Kargil episode of May-June 1999, in an uncharacteristically speedy decision, the Government of India (GoI) constituted an expert committee, tasked to recommend measures to prevent a recurrence of armed intrusions such as the one that led to this brief Indo-Pak war.
The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) headed by K Subrahmanyam, returned a scathing indictment of the national security system, and pointed out glaring deficiencies in our intelligence services, border management and higher defence organization. The KRC led to the formation of a Group of Ministers (GoM) to examine reforms in the national security system, which in turn commissioned four Task Forces for the examination of different components of the system.
The GoM, working conscientiously under LK Advani, met 27 times and produced its recommendations in the form of a public document (with many security deletions) entitled: “Reforming the National Security System” in February 2001. Against the backdrop of 26/11, it is of great interest to note some of the observations contained in this seven year old document:
• Para 2.32. While the J&K border is still active, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra and the West coast of the country are also being used for the purpose of smuggling arms. The smugglers have acquired high-powered speed boats, which can land at uncharted beaches and creeks.
• Para 5.5. The concept of border security has undergone a sea change with the growing vulnerability of the coastline and also of the airspace. In response to strengthening of security… along a sensitive land border, the transgressor is already on the lookout for soft gaps…along the coast, and if need be, from the air.
• Para 5.51. Little has been done over the years to understand or take action to create the infrastructure for the protection of India’s vast coastal areas.
• Para 5.58. The GoM felt that it was desirable to set up a Specialized Marine Police in all coastal states and island territories.
As in much else relating to this GoM report, it is now amply clear that little note was taken of the above observations, and virtually and no action resulted. Having consequently suffered a “Maritime Kargil” it is perhaps time to plan for future contingencies rather than indulge in infructuous post-mortems. For there can be little doubt that the ISI will strike again; sooner than later.
Where Do We Go From Here?
The biggest lacuna in our system of port and coastal security (if indeed one exists) is the total lack of coordination between the 14 (or more) ministries, departments and agencies (e.g. MoST, MHA, MoD, DG Shipping, ONGC, Customs, Immigration, Fisheries and so on) that have a degree of involvement in maritime related issues. Security compromises take place on an almost daily basis because the left hand does not know what the right is doing. Agencies work at cross purposes, while important harbours like Mumbai remain unguarded and porous. In this context, the GoI needs to urgently examine the following aspects of our coastal security:
• For years, Naval HQ have been pleading with the GoI that there is a dire need to constitute a National Maritime Commission for regulation, coordination and oversight of maritime security. There is intense opposition to this proposal from the bureaucracy in various ministries, purely because they fear loss of turf. The recent Mumbai disaster, has revealed gaping holes in our coastal security, and if this is not reason enough, then the intense public outcry that followed, should provide sufficient motivation for the politicians to override these irrational objections and constitute this umbrella commission.
• Every morning, thousands of fishing boats and trawlers head out to sea from fishing villages in Mumbai and its vicinity, with most returning within 24-48 hours. No amount of vigilance or patrolling by the IN or CG can regulate such a huge volume of traffic. The answer is to legislate the mandatory installation of simple inexpensive electronic transponders on every small vessel plying off our coast. As part of a Vessel and Traffic Management System (VTMS) which includes shore-based radars, this will ensure quick and automatic identification of bona fide Indian fishermen, and the isolation of suspicious vessels.
• Any organization that we evolve to combat the menace of terrorism from the sea will have little utility unless it is endowed with a resident capability to receive, compile and analyze intelligence. Having appreciated the existence of a threat, it should then have forces at its disposal, as well as the communication and logistics facilities to deploy them without delay. At the heart of such an organization would be a Joint Operations Room where a coherent, real time sea-air traffic picture is available at all times. Only the IN has the capability as well as the command & control systems necessary to handle a challenge of this nature, and the GoI should have no hesitation in designating the Commanders-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Eastern and Western Naval Commands to concurrently take charge of the two new “Coastal Commands” being contemplated. These measures will call for overriding of entrenched bureaucratic opposition, curbing inter-agency turf-battles and cutting of much red-tape. But there is a great deal at stake; and strong, resolute measures are called for. Having dwelt on coastal security, let us now cast a glance at the maritime perils that we face further out at sea.
The Lawless Gulf of Aden
Dominated by the Horn of Africa (HoA), the Gulf of Aden forms a funnel for 24,000 merchant ships annually transiting the Suez Canal carrying energy and raw material to Europe and finished goods to Africa and the Middle East. The abjectly poor Somalian Republic, which occupies most of the Horn, has been in a state of turmoil for nearly two decades, and is only notionally governed by a Transitional Federal Government. The rich Somalian fishing grounds, have for many years, been ruthlessly exploited by foreign poachers, and this is adduced as one of the reasons for deprived local fishermen taking to the lucrative occupation of piracy.
From just 10-15 incidents in 2004, the waters of the Gulf of Aden have seen acts of piracy and hijacking spiral rapidly to 80 in 2008. In an attempt to tackle this menace, the UN Security Council first adopted Resolution 1816 in June 2008, authorizing nations to deploy warships for counter-piracy operations in Somali territorial waters. This was followed by Resolution 1838 in October 2008 urging all maritime states to despatch naval units to fight piracy off the HoA.
The Impediments to Action
Despite two NATO and EU naval task forces and many individual warships having been deployed recently, piracy continues unabated, leading to great unease amongst seafarers world-wide. Should this trend persist, shipping companies and marine insurers will be forced to hike their rates. This could deal a further blow to the tottering world economy, and India will suffer too. According to US Navy sources, about 30% of the hijacked vessels are dhows, either registered in Gujarat or carrying Indian crews. Furthermore, as a major Indian Ocean maritime force, the IN is expected to uphold law and order in its neighbourhood.
Due to legal, jurisdictional and sovereignty issues, maritime nations have been very reluctant to take resolute action against Somalian pirates. India has been an exception, but let me provide a little background..
In February 2006, NHQ learnt that an Indian dhow named Bhakti Sagar registered in Porbandar, had been hijacked by Somali pirates while on passage to Kisamayu, and 25 Indian crew members had been held for a large ransom. Fortuitously, an Indian destroyer had just sailed for home from the Omani port of Salalah, and the navy’s instinctive reaction was to divert the warship to the Somali coast. It was suggested to the crisis management group and the MEA that on arrival the warship could remain outside Somali territorial waters and await developments in the expectation that her presence would have a salutary effect on the ongoing negotiations with the hijackers.
After mulling over the proposal, the MEA posed a significant but revealing question. Would the navy provide a destroyer every time an Indian citizen was in trouble anywhere? The navy’s response was that even if a single Indian citizen was in danger anywhere in the world, and there was a warship in the vicinity, it would be made available. However, while these deliberations were going on, the dhow owner was fortunately able to secure the release of his vessel and crew after negotiating a “reasonable” ransom, and our destroyer was recalled.
The recent episode involving 22 Indian crew members of MV Stolt Valour being released after long captivity on payment of a huge ransom to Somalian pirates was a little different, because the vessel happened to be foreign owned. But the fact remains that we seemed to have learnt nothing from experience, and there was a great deal of fumbling and groping in the MoD and MEA before we could formulate a delayed response.
As a sovereign democracy, India has a clear moral obligation to ensure that the 30 million strong Indian Diaspora, spread world-wide, and a hundred thousand Indian seafarers plying on the high seas, are accorded protection, wherever possible, from pirates and hijackers. Recently, the Captains of INS Tabar, and INS Mysore, by their bold and resolute actions sent out a clear message to the outlaws: “do not mess with Indian ships”. This was in the best traditions of the IN, and has brought international encomiums, not just to the IN, but to the nation.
Conclusion
By virtue of its sheer size, as well as the resilience of its people, India has so far successfully absorbed the determined onslaught of ISI backed terrorism. However, the struggle is far from over, and if our economic progress and developmental programmes are not to be stalled, India must prevail decisively over these forces. The time has therefore come to take an integrated view of these serious threats, and instead of fighting them in piecemeal fashion, to adopt an integrated approach for defence of the homeland.
Yonder on the high seas too, our stakes in terms of economics as well as security, are steadily increasing. The people of India do not expect instant dividends from the annual defence expenditure of Rs. 110,000 crores (and growing) but are certainly asking why the homeland cannot be secured against interlopers coming across the beach, and our citizens protected from lawless elements on the high seas.
The obvious answer is that purchasing military hardware is easy, but attaining the sagacity judgment and resolve required for its timely deployment is what we need to acquire.
By K. Subrahmanyam
Media and National Security
The Indian electronic media pathetically failed to counter the Pakistani propaganda and in a few cases, even lent itself to project the Pakistani propaganda without any caveats and thereby became instrumentalities of Pakistani propaganda offensive. The Indian electronic media helped to unify the Pakistani public opinion behind a perceived stand that their country was uniting bravely against a bullying Indian posture. In this `war of words' the Indian electronic media overlooked the basic fact that Indians were killed, Indian soil was invaded and Mumbai was held to ransom.
The terrorist attack on Mumbai from November 26 to 28 in 2008, and the subsequent ‘war of words’ in the media of India and Pakistan have focused attention on the role of media in the management of national security. Intercepts of the mobile telephone conversations between the terrorists during their operation in Mumbai and their handlers in Pakistan brought out the fact that the latter were able to watch the live TV coverage of the counter terror operations of security services and convey instructions to the terrorists. This has raised questions about the nature of the media coverage, which seemed to have helped the terrorists. Similar questions had also arisen during the TV coverage of the Kargil war.
Post 26/11 Brouhaha
Following the terrorist outrage in Mumbai there has been intense anger in the country not only about the failure of intelligence and inadequacies of the security system to deal with a terrorist challenge but also about the response of the government to this aggression and humiliation inflicted upon the country. This was understandable. The Government of India was very cautious in its formulation of the charge that the terrorist attack was carried out by elements originating from Pakistan. While the very first response from the Pakistan government sounded positive, within hours wild charges were leveled about Indian aircraft intrusions and a telephonic threat alleged to have been conveyed by the Indian Foreign Minister to the Pakistani President. There was engineered war hysteria in Pakistan. For knowledgeable observers, it was obvious that both terrorist attack and the subsequent war hysteria were carefully designed to create a situation of confrontation between India and Pakistan analogous to the one that followed the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. There were both mentions in Pakistani electronic and print media about its Army mobilising its forces, which are currently deployed on the Western borders in the campaign against the Taliban, to the east in order to counter the Indian threat. The Pakistani Air Force also conducted sweeps over major cities.
In retrospect, it appeared that the terrorist attack and the subsequent statements of Pakistani leadership, strongly supported by the discussions in the media on the Indian threat were meant to justify the Pakistani withdrawal of their troops from the Western front in view of their reluctance to campaign against the Taliban under US pressure. Simultaneously, a number of supply convoys transporting war materiel to US and NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan were attacked again - a signal to the US that the proposed `surge' plan of the US forces in Afghanistan might run into difficulties.
While fortunately the Government of India did not walk into the trap set by Pakistan and did not initiate any significant military moves beyond routine precautionary ones, the Indian media, particularly the electronic one, went into a high pitched campaign about action to be taken against Pakistani terrorist aggression. The standard statement of the Indian Foreign Minister that all options were being kept open was interpreted to mean in certain sections of the media as military action such as a surgical strike against terrorist camps in Pakistani territory. In turn these statements helped the Pakistani political leaders and in one instance, even the Army Chief to assert that any Indian strike would lead to retaliation in minutes. In the initial stages there were some sober voices, like that of former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif who accepted that the lone captured terrorist, Ajmal Kasab was a Pakistani national and that it was Pakistan’s responsibility to investigate the case on their side. But as the emotional pitch, with charges and countercharges, rose in the media on both sides - especially in the electronic and language print media, even such people in Pakistan reversed their earlier stands and united to demand that India should produce hard evidence and proof that will stand up in a court of law.
In the media on both sides, it seemed to be overlooked that this was only the first stage of the investigation and at this stage, the main efforts were to be to follow up leads. Any conclusive proof would only be obtained when bits and pieces of evidence could be put together after lengthy investigation. The Indian electronic media projected a number of Pakistani personalities in their broadcasts demanding hard evidence and proof and that Pakistani agencies should be associated with the investigation. The media did not point out that there were enough leads for Pakistani agencies to follow on their own side. It was clear from an early stage that intercepts of telephone conversations between the terrorists and their handlers were available not only to the Indian Intelligence Agency collecting communication and electronic intelligence, but also to all other major nations such as the US and the UK, who had the required technology and capabilities. Pakistan, which had the resources and technology, did not investigate the leads available from the telephone conversations.
The Naiveté of India’s Electronic Media
The Indian electronic media pathetically failed to counter the Pakistani propaganda and in a few cases, even lent itself to project the Pakistani propaganda without any caveats and thereby became instrumentalities of Pakistani propaganda offensive. The Indian electronic media helped to unify the Pakistani public opinion behind a perceived stand that their country was uniting bravely against a bullying Indian posture. In this `war of words' the Indian electronic media overlooked the basic fact that Indians were killed, Indian soil was invaded and Mumbai was held to ransom. Various talk shows treated the issue as though it were a two party game played under equitable rules and not as a case of terrorist aggression in which one side was the victim and the attack was planned, prepared and launched from the other side. While terrorism may be perpetrated in both countries, it does not absolve the country to which the terrorists belong. The country, where the terror was plotted and launched, will still have to bear the responsibility of investigating the origin and motives of such a plot. This country not only suffered from intelligence failure but also a systems failure to meet the terrorist challenge as well as a gigantic intellectual failure on the part of our media, particularly the electronic media that could not distinguish between the aggressor and victim, between investigating leads and producing a case that will stand in a court of law.
This was not the first time this country found itself in such a pitiable stage of media projection and public opinion formation. At the time of the Kargil war, there were accounts of Pakistanis having penetrated months and years earlier into our territory. There were accounts of their having built three-storeyed structures. However, at that time, TV coverage was much less intensive than it is today and therefore the damage that could be done was much less. But lessons should have been learnt from the Kargil experience. The Kargil Review Committee report devoted a whole chapter on `The Public Dimension'. ‘Operation Parakram’ was a prolonged affair but was not reported on as an acute crisis like the attacks on the Parliament or on the Kaluchak Army camp. Even those attacks did not last for 60 hours as the one on Mumbai. It was appalling to see the media attempting to discuss in detail various military options open to India, overlooking that national security demanded, if at all such an option were to be exercised they cannot be subjected to public discussion.
Crisis Management: The Indian Shortcomings
Many have compared the Mumbai events with 9/11 attack on World Trade Towers in New York and the Pentagon. The stark contrast between the events in US and in Mumbai was the absence of leadership in Mumbai. The New York Mayor, Rudolfo Giuliani, took charge immediately and cordoned off the site from the media and kept the media at a distance and arranged for regular briefings. In Washington DC, Defence Secretary Rumsfeld took command of the operations. In the absence of the President and the National Security Adviser at the national level, the Vice President was in command. Even under those circumstances there was criticism about the handling of the crisis including the media coverage. Following the 9/11 Commission Report, the largest reorganisation in US administrative history was carried out with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.
An attack from across the sea by a group of well armed and directed terrorists who were not expected to survive the assault on an urban centre was a new experience to Indian security services and forces. 9/11, the Bali bombing, the Madrid rail attack, the 7/7 London bombings, the attacks on Mumbai suburban trains and on Bangalore, Hyderabad, Delhi, Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Varanasi obviously were not fully absorbed. Contingency plans to face such threats presumably were not developed. The failure in this respect has been admitted by the new Home Minister, Mr. P.Chidambaram. In Mumbai, in spite of there being a police control room it was obvious that there was no unified command exercising control over the whole operation. One of the consequences of this inadequacy is the close access of the media to the ongoing operations and the live real time TV coverage being utilised by the handlers of the terrorists. Yet another was inaccurate, scrappy but sensationalist reporting.
Unlike in the US and UK, where both public men and media observe self discipline, in the Indian conditions, it was absent. At the time of a security operation, politicians and various officials not in the command chain should not be talking loosely about the operation. But our media asks questions on operations at every level and worse still, every politician and high level official not connected with the ongoing operation air their views irresponsibly. The Chief Minister of Mumbai was not the appropriate authority to divulge information about the number of terrorists involved. In UK, when the 7/7 bombings took place, the person in charge was the Commissioner of London Metropolitan Police. After the event, the Home Secretary made a statement in the House of Commons.
The Media as Force Multiplier
There is today an understanding both in the media and the government that a new set of rules is required to ensure that the Mumbai mistakes are not repeated if similar security crises were to occur in future. Press reports indicate that the Government has come up with amendments to the Cable Television Network Rules of 1994, to regulate television coverage during military and anti terrorist operations. In light of the Mumbai attacks the National Broadcasters Association has also drafted its own guidelines for crisis coverage. The first set of draft amendments has evoked strong protests. The media and the government are expected to discuss this in detail before a set of guidelines is finalised.
But the present opportunity should be utilised to look at the relationship between the armed forces, Intelligence Agencies and para-military security forces. This is the age of information and information technology. At one time it was conventional wisdom that the armed forces came into the picture after diplomacy failed and security forces started operations after a security crisis developed. In today's world the function of the armed forces is not only to fight and win wars as and when they happen but more importantly, to prevent wars. Similarly, para-military forces and security services have to operate proactively to prevent terrorists from achieving their objective. Public cooperation is a necessary prerequisite to have an effective counter terrorism strategy. All these considerations demand that armed forces, para-military forces and Intelligence Agencies learn how to use information as a force multiplier by gathering intelligence and mobilising public cooperation. In other words, armed forces, Intelligence Agencies and paramilitary forces should have an information policy and an infrastructure for public relations and information dissemination.
Recently the Director General of MI-5 in the UK went public, a historically unprecedented event. The MI-5, which is the UK secret service, was known for maintaining silence but the recent public emergence of the DG, MI-5 was justified on the need to improve the standard for recruitment of personnel in the service. On the same logic a change in mindset is needed among our armed forces, Intelligence Agencies and para-military forces in regard to information dissemination policy.
Armed Forces and the Media
A report on the armed forces and their relationship with the media was commissioned in 2001, by the Ministry of Defence and the task was entrusted to veteran journalist B.G. Verghese. Unfortunately his report has neither been published nor have its recommendations been implemented. In most of the advanced democracies, the media has reporters, editors and anchor persons who specialize in national security matters. A very healthy relationship develops between the armed forces, Intelligence Agencies and para-military forces and the media. The result of such an arrangement is a regular flow of news from the armed forces, and para-military forces to the media, keeping the public informed on a day to day basis. The media personnel are able to check and report only verified and accurate information and they themselves have a responsible understanding of national interest.
In India too, there are such very well informed and responsible media personnel, especially in the print media. But there has been a veritable media explosion in the recent period and there are nearly 60 twenty four hour news channels in the electronic media all over the country. They are under tremendous competitive pressure, which leads to sensationalist and inaccurate reporting. Well trained personnel at this stage to discharge their responsibilities in a restrained manner are not available in adequate numbers. It is explained, on behalf of the electronic media, that many of the deficiencies in the handling of such crisis situations are attributable to the incipient stage of development of the media.
It is equally obvious that the Government has not geared itself to meet the challenges of the information age and new information technologies. A significant section of the armed forces and security forces are on continuous deployment in counter insurgency operations in Jammu & Kashmir and in the North East. Counter insurgency operations involve winning the hearts and minds of the people whom the insurgents endeavour to set against the state. In those operations the media plays a crucial role and this essential understanding should persuade the government and the armed forces and security forces to mobilize media support. One wonders whether the idea of an embedded correspondent, as was done by the US forces during the wars in West Asia will find favour in India. While there is reasonably satisfactory cooperation between the armed forces and security forces and the media in Kashmir, there is an impression that the public at large will benefit more if there are regular background briefings on the insurgency situation instead of each terrorist attack being handled exclusively on its own by the media.
In all democracies it is a commonly obtained situation in which particular media persons get more advantageous access to specific agencies or armed services. India is no exception. Although there are both advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of public in such person-specific contacts between the armed forces and security forces and the media there are distinct advantages in instituting regular periodic briefings for interested editors-in-chief, senior editors and senior bureau chiefs specialising in national security matters at political, service chief and top bureaucratic levels.
Information Availability and Control of Media
Unlike in the period before the World War II, information about the strength of forces, equipment deployed, location of forces, weapons sales transactions and even development of new equipment and weapons are no longer secrets in this age of satellites. Movement of formations and equipment can be observed by satellites and such information is often commercially available. In such circumstances it is ridiculous to persist in keeping matters classified from one's own population when they are available to potential adversaries. Unfortunately in India there has been a persistent mental inertia to review information policies on national security matters which have become obsolete and the continuance of which is counter productive.
While in the recent years there have been attempts at rectifying some of these shortcomings, not much progress has been made because of turf battles. Information dissemination has fallen between the two schools of those who emphasise that techniques of communication are important and medium is the message and those who focus on domain knowledge. This issue needs to be sorted out. Out of the two, the techniques of communication and the domain knowledge, the former is more easily acquired. This consideration should influence the creation of media interface mechanism in each service and agency of the armed forces and security forces.
Attempting to control the media through state regulations is as counter-productive as trying to control the disruptive behaviour of our parliamentarians through executive fiats. In a democracy, the media should be encouraged to develop its own norms of restrained behaviour as our parliamentarians are expected to do for themselves. Parliamentarians with nexus to organised crime such as smuggling and hawala are as much a national security threat as an irresponsible media can be. In both cases the evolution of democratic polity is expected to develop optimal norms of behaviour.
The difference between the oldest mature democracy and the largest still-to-mature democracy can be seen in the testimonies to a US Senate Committee by key US Security officials on the Mumbai terrorist attack and the absence of a similar learning process in respect of the same event by the Indian Parliament. India is still to develop a culture of learning from its mistakes and carrying out reforms on the basis of a comprehensive study by an expert group. While as a democracy it will no doubt rectify its mistakes and move forward, as an incipient one and not yet adequately mature the mistake rectification process is bound to be slow, incremental and more costly to the nation than it needs to be.
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