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 NEED OF ACTION BY AIR MARSHAL (RETD) B K PANDEY
"The lines between external and internal threats to national security are getting increasingly blurred accentuating the need for a coherent command and control structure, high degree of synergy between the various agencies and induction of higher level of technology for meaningful homeland security."
Bomb blasts and terrorist attacks appear to have become a routine feature in India. Almost as soon as the debris is cleared and blood is washed off the streets, the carnage recedes from public memory into oblivion. In the last three years, there have been over sixteen incidents in which hundreds of innocent lives have been lost apart from damage to property and disruption of livelihood. Such incidents are regarded as problems related to ‘internal security’ and statistical records updated accordingly. Instead of bringing the real culprits to book, investigations and subsequent actions often degenerate into motivated and petty political controversy detracting from the core issues involved.
The 26/11 episode however was different in character from the routine though somewhat similar to the attack on the parliament building in 2001. The Mumbai episode was another blatant and brutal assault on the sovereignty of the nation and in essence, was a military operation exceptionally well planned over an extended period of time and executed with unimaginable audacity without concern for reprisal or escalation. The impact of the mission was magnified as the targets were distinctly high profile. The victims included many from the affluent segments of society as also eminent citizens from abroad. Already reeling under the impact of global economic meltdown, the financial capital of India lay traumatized by this rape and the intelligence/security apparatus of the nation without the proverbial fig leaf.
But what is more disconcerting is the response from the various agencies to the crisis. The police force in Mumbai, like those in other states, are trained, equipped and oriented for the protection of VIPs and oppression of the innocent. Other than isolated acts of bravery in this case, the absence of a coherent counter terrorist strategy and the lack of capability of the civil police to handle the situation, was glaring. There was also tragic lack of professionalism in the encounter in which three highly rated senior police officials of the Anti-Terrorist Squad, a specialized outfit created to tackle such incidents, totally misread the situation and fell victim to terrorist bullets without a fight. Deployment of the Indian Navy Commandos was delayed on account of the bureaucratic hassles that exist in any effort at coordination between the state and central agencies. There was inordinate delay in the arrival of the NSG perhaps for the same reason. The infantry battalion of the Indian Army located in Mumbai which is experienced in combating terrorists in J&K was conspicuous by its absence – perhaps not requisitioned at all.
It was abundantly clear that not only had the intelligence agencies been defeated in their own homeland, response from the security agencies lacked speed, centralized control/direction, cohesion and coordination. Besides, operating at a low level of technology in respect of weapons and other systems, security forces were clearly handicapped vis-à-vis the intruders.
At the level of the government, the response was injurious to the national psyche and had a shattering impact on the Indian aspirations and visions of greatness. It is hardly a matter of pride that India should approach the US and the UK for protection against uncivilized conduct of a politically weak and unstable neighbour that is teetering on the verge of economic collapse and virtually a failed state. The approach of the Indian government lacked focus and was embarrassingly defensive without even a hint of capability or intention of resolute action beyond a bland “all options open” syndrome. This was definitely not an approach befitting a nation of over a billion, a growing regional and economic entity boasting of capability to project military power from the Gulf of Aden to the Straits of Malacca.
India ought to know that Pakistan continues to be a client state of the US with reported links between their intelligence agencies and the armed forces. It is also known that the writ of the Pakistani government does not run in large parts of the country in the North West. As the Pakistani government is unable to exercise effective control of unruly elements, US forces strike targets at will within Pakistani territory in the pursuit of their own national security objectives. At this juncture, with change of government imminent and preoccupation with their own difficulties, the US is hardly in a position to exert pressure on Pakistan. Britain on the other hand has little or no influence in the region and hence can do little beyond show of diplomatic support which can only be of cosmetic value. Diplomatic intervention by the US and Britain in fact could be damaging to our interest as 26/11 could be immediately clubbed with the larger problem of global terrorism diluting its significance and implications for India.
The Indian armed forces are over a million strong and the Indian para military forces are even larger. The command and control structures are fragmented amongst multifarious agencies and as demonstrated in 26/11, effective response in a crisis is virtually impossible. The lines between external and internal threats to national security are getting increasingly blurred accentuating the need for a coherent command and control structure, high degree of synergy between the various agencies and induction of higher level of technology for meaningful homeland security.
At the international level, efforts at demarche against Pakistan are unlikely to be effective unless riding piggyback on the enormous military power available with the nation.
Views from Air Marshal (Retd) V K Verma
"The failures and their accompanying solutions surface each time a terrorist strike takes place. This time too, the solutions have been retrieved, dusted, repackaged and re-announced Maybe, we mean business this time. I sincerely hope so."
Deja vu. Too many similarities. The scenario is very familiar – only the time factor is moving at much faster pace. Three months compressed into three days. A 3-hour movie instead of the 90 episodes of a tele serial.
May 99 it was. Indo Pak bonhomie resurrected the Lahore bus. A new bold initiative written in the poet PM’s personal style. “Hopes of peace” and a “solution to the Kashmir problem” flew around in the atmosphere in the shape of kites waiting for some good tugging by the kite-flyer or a God-sent thermal which would boost the kites’ height and flight. It appeared on the subcontinent that finally the spring had arrived and these colourful kites would herald a new era of peace.
The media did not pick up the initial buzz. Some stray reporting of infiltrators in the Kargil area remained confined to the Army circles. When it was realised that the infiltrators were more than the assumption/suspicion and Air Force would have to be co-opted as only Air Power probably would neutralise the infiltrators, the buzz spread. The Air Force leadership refused to play ball and demanded authorisation from the country’s top leadership before it would unleash air power. The story then spilled out onto the front pages. The peace kites floundered. The skirmishes came out into the open. Army and Air Force were pressed into service. The Pakistan’s political leadership and the military refused to publicly accept that it was their regular well trained Army that was sent in by them into Kargil and its surroundings. There was an absolute denial which went to the ridiculous extent of non-acceptance of the bodies of their brethren for the final rites.
The Kargil saga is well known to the nation. Then too there was a massive intelligence failure. Individual warning bells by various players were ignored and the brunt of the consequences of these failures was borne by our Army and the Air Force. The terrain, the heights, the weapons, the training levels of the infiltrators, the coordination etc left everybody stunned. Sheer ingenuity, naked bravery and coordinated response by the two services eventually won the day for the nation. Then too the Armed Forces were the toast of the town. Awards – both presidential and financial were bestowed on the brave. Barkha Dutt with troops was on television showcasing her journalistic prowess - heralding the American embedded journalist concept a few years prior to this term gaining currency. The Kargil aftermath was a heady glow for a nation desperately searching for its place in the sun.
The Kargil post mortem report brought into light the numerous failures, but let us highlight its chief recommendations. It suggested that the jointness between the three services be institutionalised, our procurement procedures for purchase of defence items be made more functional leading to delivery in a time–responsive manner. It suggested integration of the service HQrs with the Ministry of Defence and creation of a CDS who would provide single point of military advice to the government. A decade later we are still waddling through a bureaucratic maze in the hope of getting these recommendations implemented. In our typical Indian style we have implemented some half measures towards these goals, changed the interpretation of others and ignored the rest.
2008 has President Zardari sworn in after another attempt by Pakistan at democracy. Instead of the Lahore Bus we have the Muzaffarabad Bus. Lots of sound bites in the air. Once again the kites with “Hopes of Peace” and a “solution to the Kashmir Problem” float up in the air – and why not ! the spring is here. To provide the thermals to these kites President Zardari pulls out a rabbit from his hat in the HT Summit by announcing a “ No first use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan” and follows it up by stating that there is a bit of Indian in every Pakistani and a bit of Pakistani in every Indian. Now the kites really soar into the blue yonder.
Like the Kargil saga – a few Pakistani commando terrorists use the sea route to land on the shores of Mumbai and storm the elite citadels of Taj and Oberoi. Simultaneously they target the travellers at the Railway Station and Leopold Cafe through indiscriminate automatic fire. The innocent Israelis at the Nariman House are specially selected to showcase to the world their revengeful stance against Jews. Like the Kargil fiasco this edifice of massacre is built on massive intelligence failure. Not that the bits were not there. Nobody collected these bits to build the big picture - a major responsibility of the int machinery . During the Kargil fiasco the common man in the form of shepherds had done their bit - they informed the authorities of the presence of infiltrators. Here too the fisher folk of the area reported to their police station of the arrival of these suspicious youngsters from the sea. They too were ignored. At the Taj we have Barkha Dutt again on television – giving us a blow by blow account of the situation as it kept erupting – sometimes with fire at other times with firing. Once again the consequences of all the failures was borne by our brave soldiers through naked bravery who blunted the attacks. The sheer daredevilry, the planning, the amount of ammo available with the terrorists, their expertise in handling weapons, their intimate knowledge of the layout of the hotels, their tactical knowledge, their expertise bewildered one and all. Like the Kargil times the Pakistani establishment refuses their ownership.
The post mortem has just begun. The most prominent reasons cited are intelligence failures, lack of appropriate central investigative agency, lack of jointness and difficulties of centre-state relations. These failures and their accompanying solutions surface each time a terrorist strike takes place. This time too, the solutions have been retrieved, dusted, repackaged and re-announced. The major difference this time around has been that these have been accompanied by a few resignations at the very top. Maybe, we mean business this time. I sincerely hope so. And I fervently pray that these recommendations fare better than the recommendations post Kargil. The appointment of P Chidambram as the new Home Minister infuses some hope as he has the experience in these matters – having handled Punjab crisis in the past. It is the leaders who drive change – and he has the vision, stature and the capability to ensure that we don’t face such fiascos again. Am I the eternal optimist surrounded by “Enough is Enough” sentiment drowning my voice? Maybe. But along with optimism I have another flaw – fatalism. India’s destiny will ensure that we don’t go wrong again. Optimism mixed with a dash of fatalism may not be right recipe this time around. But I think the citizens have given their resounding wake up call and now the establishment has no choice but to deliver.
Views from Lt General (Retd) V K Kapoor
India's financial capital Mumbai was struck once again by terrorists. The difference from earlier attacks in 1993 and 2006 was that instead of planting bombs at vital places and in trains to ensure maximum casualties and derive utmost publicity, this time it was a suicide mission led by a well-trained and suitably equipped fidayeen squad of 10 terrorists from Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), all from Pakistan, who apparently had planned the mission well in advance and had complete details of the intended targets. The terror strikes which began on Wednesday, November 26 at about 9.30 pm were finally defeated by November 29 morning after nearly 62 hours of battle by the security forces. The places targeted included Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST), Leopold Café, Nariman House and the hotels, Triden-Oberoi and Taj Mahal Palace and Tower Hotel. With TV channels adopting a proactive role in capturing every action and retaliation, the nation watched stunned as the gory details unfolded in the minutest detail.
Sinister intentions
The pattern of the Mumbai attacks, the targeting pattern and the subsequent killing spree suggest the following aims/intentions:
. To strike at India's global and financial heartland which is Mumbai
. To strike at foreigners (tourists and business personnel) especially from the US, Europe and Israel who would be easy to locate and target in India
. To club India with the western world for Islamist terrorism due to India's growing relations with the US
. To show to the world that India is not a safe investment destination
. To hit India's commercial relations with the West and the rest of the world
. To reveal the notorious softness of the Indian state, that it is incapable of looking after its own interests, and, therefore, does not deserve a place in the UN.
. To provoke an Indian reaction and perhaps cause an India-Pakistan conflict.
The weak Indian response
India's response to the terrorist attack can be assessed in the light of terrorist actions, which highlight our weaknesses and are briefly analysed. The major weaknesses and some remedies are enumerated in the succeeding paragraphs.
Intelligence failure: This can be examined in three phases:
. Preparatory Phase: Thorough preparation and audacious execution by the terrorists indicate deliberate planning, advance information of intended targets and assured logistics support by some local contacts or sleeper cells. This preparation would have involved a period of at least a few weeks if not months and to that if we add the aspect of training the terrorists themselves it indicates a colossal failure of India's intelligence agencies.
. Movement Phase: The movement of the terrorists from their home base (Karachi) to their ultimate destination is also a dismal story of failure of India's intelligence agencies. No specific information could be gained even after they were launched from their home base in Karachi. They were for a couple of days at sea, on their mother ship after which they transferred to a hijacked Indian fishing trawler and subsequently to dinghies in which they moved to the city's shores. They remained undetected throughout. This also underlines the quality poor quality of India's maritime surveillance of its 7,516 km of open coastline.
After the terrorists moved inland, they divided themselves into smaller groups and headed for their respective targets. Here, notwithstanding the personal bravery of many individuals, the helplessness of Bombay's police force was obvious. Lack of information, poor command and control, and inadequately armed policemen led to a chaotic situation where groups of just two to three terrorists simultaneously operating in four to five places were able to literally paralyse Mumbai.
. Combat Phase: The story of the combat inside the hotels will perhaps emerge slowly. However, it is clear that security forces were operating blindly inside the hotels clearing one room after the other, perhaps on each floor, which not only gave more time to the terrorists to mow down the hostages/guests but perhaps emboldened them in their actions.
Lack of surveillance inside the hotels: Mutual back slapping and praise notwithstanding, the fact remains that a nation of over a billion people, one that counts itself among the fastest growing economies of the world and has dreams of sitting at the high table at the UN, could not get rid of a few terrorists quickly enough. Expansive, highprofile hotels, which are likely targets of the terrorists, must be fitted with surveillance devices which can be viewed from a central control room and which are networked to the police control rooms and to the mobile command post set up for the crises.
Delayed response: It seems that the NSG took nearly nine hours to reach Mumbai. This delay allowed the terrorists to embed themselves in their respective areas. This may have been one of the reasons why it took so long in finally eliminating just a few terrorists. It is evident that a force like the NSG must have its own transportation means including fixed wing aircraft and helicopters and ground mobility in the form of all terrain vehicles (ATVs).
State police forces: The three officers of Mumbai Police-ATS Chief Hemant Karkare, Addition Commissioner Ashok Kamathe and encounter specialist Vijay Salaskar-who were shot dead on November 26 were undoubtedly the pride of Mumbai's police force. However, astonishing as it may seem, our police forces are neither trained nor equipped to tackle real terrorists. Counter terrorism requires battle hardened soldiery or highly experienced personnel in counter terrorist operations. Those who have had experience of fighting foreign terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir are the most suited because they know and understand all tricks of this trade. The tactics employed by the terrorists in Mumbai are akin to the tactics employed by Pakistan trained terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian Army, especially its Special Forces units, are experts in this field, even better than the NSG whose Special Action Groups comprise army officers and jawans, but the organisation is headed by a police officer for some quaint reason. Such unnecessary dilutions reduce the response and effectiveness of an organisation.
Remedial measures
Police reforms: Strengthening, modernisation and training of police forces in all states, as well as the Central police forces, is a necessity. The concept of the "beat constable", who was always the key functionary to feed the intelligence community must be revived.
Strike forces: Units must be raised for each metropolis on the pattern of Indian Army's Special Forces (SF) and these units if they comprise army personnel can be turned over in peace time with other SF units in insurgency areas to keep them honed for battle at all times.
Need for unified command: India needs to evolve for a clear cut chain of command for counter terrorist operations especially where a plethora of forces are likely to be mustered. A command chain along with a mobile command post with necessary communications and other facilities are essential.
Revamp the National Security Council: Currently headed by a police officer, M.K. Narayanan, with two deputies and an advisor from the intelligence community, this organisation has failed to perform with distinction. Sorely in need of action-oriented professionals, it is instead teeming with members of the chattering community and "file pushers". The National Security Advisor has to be a credible centralised authority who appreciates the magnitude of the task and is able to enforce accountability. A retired service chief or a suitable senior officer or even a dynamic police chief with operational expertise should be able to restore sanity to this doddering body.
Form a federal agency: From media reports it seems that India is planning to amend the national security act to constitute the National Security Authority, whatever that means. If it is going to be another toothless organisation, like the National Disaster Management Authority, then let us not have it. A federal agency would be useful if it is patterned on the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the US with similar powers.
Induct new technologies: The central counter terrorist force in the country needs networked communications with all concerned. They will require actionable intelligence before launching the operations, together with precision firepower, rapid reaction capability and night fighting aids. At present, the NSG lacks most of these capabilities.
Improve quality of leadership: We need political leadership which can lead this great country through the most formidable internal and external security challenges which India faces. India has the political talent to provide this type of leadership but will the political parties shed their pettiness and come together to steer the nation to its natural destiny?
In conclusion
The fidayeen attacks in Mumbai have once again alerted the nation to the dangers that lie ahead. Clearly there was failure of India's intelligence and security mechanism and the security units were slow to respond, which means that the whole system really needs to be revamped. The country now needs to put its act together. Counter terrorism mechanism must be forged on the lessons learnt in the past. There is no need to reinvent the wheel. We need to build on the existing strengths and not hesitate to throw out the dead wood.
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